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In 1954 the Supreme Court declared that racially separate education was
inherently unequal. ' It thus abandoned the separate but equal doctrine2 and ordered
the elimination of segregated school systems "with all deliberate speed." 3 Local
school officials and lower federal courts, toward whom the Court turned for
effectuation of the desegregation mandate, 4 responded instead with deliberate evasion
and resistance.5 Faced with such recalcitrance, the Court during the 1960s consis-
tently rejected plans that disguised delay tactics and tokenism. 6 After more than a
decade of delay and strategies designed to preserve the status quo rather than actually
dismantle dual school systems, 7 the Court announced that "[t]he time for mere
'deliberate speed' ha[d] run out."8 It consequently demanded plans that "promis[e]
realistically to work now." 9
The Court's language, although forceful, proved to be far from encompassing.
During the 1970s, the Court articulated three major limiting principles that delineated
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1. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown 1).
2. The Court "conclude[d] that in the field of public education the doctrine of separate but equal has no place."
Id. The decision became the basis not only for desegregation of schools, but also for other public facilities. See G.
GuNTHER, Cof NstToAL L,,w 639 & n.l (1985).
3. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown 11).
4. Noting the "varied [nature of] local school problems[,]" the Court assigned primary responsibility for assessing
and solving them to school officials. Id. at 299. Given a need to determine whether constitutional principles were
implemented in good faith, the Court decided to have judges closest to local conditions evaluate compliance. See id.
5. Rather than insisting upon an immediate cessation of an unconstitutional condition, the Court anticipated
complexities in the transition from dual to desegregated systems. See id. By vesting local school officials and federal
district courts with primary responsibility to conform the desegregation mandate to local contexts, the Court tried to defuse
a politically explosive issue. Its reliance was misplaced, however, as massive resistance proved to be the primary
consequence. One of the school systems which the Court declared unconstitutional in Brown I remained segregated at least
a decade later. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 862 (5th Cir. 1966), corrected,
380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). The lead case in Brown 1, moreover, was reopened pursuant
to the claim that desegregation still had not been effectuated. See Brown v. Board of Education, No. T-316 (D. Kan.
Apr. 9, 1987). The district court's finding, however, was to the contrary. See id.
6. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. Prince Edward County Bd. of Educ.,
377 U.S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
7. Freedom of choice, pupil placement, and student transfer plans, purportedly constructed as remedies, actually
perpetuated rather than eliminated segregation. See Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and
Prospects, 64 CoLusM. L. REv. 193, 203-12 (1964).
8. Griffin v. Prince Edward County Bd. of Educ., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
9. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis in original). Consistent with that principle,
the Court denied a request for a semester's delay in implementing a desegregation plan. Despite arguments that the delay
was sought only to avoid mid-term disruption, the Court asserted that "the obligation of every school district is to
terminate dual systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools." Alexander v. Holmes County Bd.
of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam).
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significant perimeters around the duty to desegregate. The obligation to eliminate
racially identifiable schools was reaffirmed for instances in which the segregation had
been state enforced.' 0 To the extent segregation could be characterized as de facto
and thus not tied to official action, however, no obligation to desegregate was found
to exist." Interdistrict remedies, moreover, were not required absent proof that
discriminatory action from outside a district contributed substantially to segregated
conditions within it.12 Finally, the Court decided that the duty to desegregate would
not endure beyond a finding that a school system had become unitary. 13 Once a dual
system was dismantled, no obligation remained to preserve the fruits of constitution-
ally mandated desegregation. 14 As discussed later,' 5 the desegregation boundaries
identified by the Court during the 1970s have proved troublesome and leave
untouched the consequences of racial aversion attributable to cultural conditioning
rather than official mandate.
Central to Brown v. Board of Education'6 was the objective of abolishing
racially identifiable schools because racial separation represented an official stamp of
inferiority and had an adverse effect upon the psychological well-being and
educational opportunities of its victims.' 7 Without belittling the significance of
Brown one must recognize what the Court then and later did not address or
accomplish. To the extent equal protection doctrine has not been calibrated to respond
to pertinent social dynamics or underlying sources of racial aversion, segregation has
merely been forced to alter its visage.
The desegregation mandate was formulated at approximately the time when
unprecedented personal mobility and suburban development coalesced to expand and
redefine metropolitan areas. By the 1970s, new school districts were emerging in
suburbs that had only recently developed. Insofar as their newness militated against
finding a record of discrimination, they were largely immunized from the desegre-
gation mandate.18 As equal protection reasoning became increasingly mired in
narrowly defined concepts of official and purposeful action 19 and strayed further
10. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 737 (1974).
11. "[P]urpose or intent to segregate [is] . . . the differentiating factor between de jure and so-called de facto
segregation." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
12. The Court concluded that the right to attend a unitary school was not denied "[u]nleass petitioners drew the
district lines in a discriminatory fashion, or arranged for white [and black] students . . . to attend [separate] schools."
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746-47 (1974).
13. "[Hlaving once implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern in order to remedy . . . perceived
constitutional violations, . . . no duty exists to prevent or correct resegregation unless it is the product of official
discriminatory purpose." Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976). See also Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971).
14. See id.
15. See infra notes 54-91 and accompanying text.
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17. Id. at 494. The Court relied heavily upon social scientists' findings to the effect that separation on the basis of
race generates an enduring sense of inferiority that, among other things, retards educational development. The harm of
stigmatizing action is two-fold: it injures psychologically "by assaulting a person's self-respect and human dignity, and
[by] brand[ing] . . . with a sign that designates inferior status to others .... " Lawrence, The Id, the Ego and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 350-51 (1987).
18. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
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from the flexibility characteristic of Brown,20 it became increasingly apparent that
equal protection doctrine would focus upon the most overt symptoms but not the
underlying causes of segregation. The Court in Brown eliminated a long-standing
methodology that was the consequence of racial aversion. Although official segre-
gation was declared legally wrong, however, the irrational majoritarian perceptions
and cultural conditioning responsible for it survived. Other means for maintaining
racial separation could thus survive or replace old ones. Having only scratched the
surface and not having focused upon underlying cause, the Court in the 1970s could
naively assert that white flight immediately following a desegregation order merely
represented a "normal pattern of human migration.''21
Given the Court's insistence during the 1950s and 1960s upon genuine rather
than pretended equal educational opportunity, but failure during the 1970s to
recalibrate the desegregation mandate in response to substantial revisions of the social
milieu or variant manifestations of racial aversion, a central question for the 1980s
and beyond is how to consolidate, preserve, and enhance equal protection accom-
plishments. To the extent that a system was officially segregated in the past, but has
since been declared unitary, official efforts to perpetuate racial balance are not
constitutionally obligatory.22 Whether pursuant to state law or otherwise,2 3 integra-
tion effectuation, and maintenance policies have nonetheless evolved but, to the
extent that they evince majoritarian sensitivity, they have evoked growing constitu-
tional attention.2 4
Such concepts are part of a circular process because they respond to demo-
graphic changes that in turn may be engendered by race-based anxiety or aversion.
Racially homogeneous suburbs have been effectively immune from desegregation
principles creating, at least for now, largely impenetrable barriers to enduring
integration. With a shrinking base of white students available for facilitating
desegregation objectives, new policies have emerged purportedly to discourage the
exodus of white students from city schools. 25 Such plans reflect a sense that equal
protection goals are not well-served if existing distance, anxiety, or fear are
exacerbated. 26 However, they also evince increased sensitivity to majoritarian
20. Flexibility in effectuating equal protection aims was evinced by the very embrace of the desegregation
principle. Despite acknowledging efforts to equalize "tangibles" such as buildings, curricula, and teacher qualifications
and salaries, for instance, the Court became convinced that the separate but equal doctrine could not guarantee genuinely
equal educational opportunity. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,492 (1954). The formula was abandoned
because it was perceived to be incapable of effectuating equal protection objectives under any circumstances. See id. The
desegregation mandate thus was not ordained to become stale but rather, consistent with the spirit of Brown, amenable
to adjustments necessary to make it responsive to changing circumstances,
21. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436 (1976).
22. See id. at 436-37; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971).
23. For instance, it is a matter of New York "State educational policy to promote integration." Parent Ass'n of
Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 711 (2d Cir. 1979).
24. See, e.g., Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986);
Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 738 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1984).
25. Curtailment of busing and reintroduction of neighborhood schools have reflected official concern that too many
white students would otherwise leave city schools. See Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986). Controls upon increases in minority enrollments at certain schools have been set pursuant
to similar concerns regarding white flight. See Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 738 F.2d 574
(2d Cir. 1984).
26. Remedies such as mandatory cross-town busing, which may have been essential for dismantling dual school
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instincts27 and impose significant burdens upon the victims of segregation. 28 The
consequences suggest not only that the effect of the desegregation doctrine, for all the
trauma associated with it, has been less than pervasive and enduring; they also point
to a need for more forthright and sensitive appraisal of the nature and sources of equal
protection harm, to escape the straitjacket of the discriminatory intent standard and
other limiting principles introduced in the 1970s, and perhaps to focus less upon what
motivates official action and more upon what meaning society attaches to such
action. 29
Despite an opportunity to focus upon those concerns this term in Riddick v.
School Board of City of Norfolk,30 and intimations that it would do SO, 31 the Court
eventually refrained from confronting them. Its disinclination to consider the case,
however, almost certainly represents deferred rather than denied review 32 of issues
that its restrictive contouring of the desegregation mandate has helped eventuate. This
article will (1) trace the evolution of the desegregation mandate and its limiting
principles which have made much segregation constitutionally untouchable and
resegregation constitutionally resistant; (2) examine the majoritarian-sensitive poli-
cies which are evolving pursuant to the curtailed desegregation mandate; and
(3) consider appropriate judicial responses to the vexing equal protection questions
they engender and post-desegregation alternatives for equal educational opportunity.
II. THE EVOLUTION AND EVISCERATION OF THE DESEGREGATION MANDATE
Adverse reaction to the desegregation decree, as originally formulated, was
swift and visceral and has been well-documented. 33 The Court, deferring to the
idiosyncrasies of diverse communities, needing grass-roots cooperation, and proba-
systems, may be discontinued once a unitary system is effectuated and have been abandoned in the name of integration
maintenance. See Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 540 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
27. Courts, for instance, seem increasingly disposed to distinguish what they characterize as "the defense of white
flight as a smokescreen to avoid integration and realistically considering and dealing with the practical problems involved
in making voluntary efforts to achieve integration." Id. at 539; Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach,
598 F.2d 705, 720 (1979) (quoting Higgins v. Board of Educ. of Grand Rapids, 508 F.2d 779, 794 (6th Cir. 1974)). The
emergence during the 1970s of more majoritarian-sensitive analysis by the Court is discussed infra notes 65-84 and
accompanying text.
28. Funding, for instance, may be significantly less for minority schools compared to other schools within the same
district. See The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 20, 1986, at 29-30, col. I. Allocation of human resources, moreover,
may be a function of views by teachers and principals that inner-city schools are undesirable places to work. Id.
29. Racially segregated schools, for instance, have been officially contemplated and countenanced albeit
purportedly to stablize city-wide racial balance in public schools. See, e.g., Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d
521, 527 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986); Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach. 738
F.2d 574, 576 (2d Cir. 1984).
30. See 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
31. An application to the Court for an injunction against the plan was denied. See 106 S. Ct. 2913 (1986). Justices
Marshall and Blackmun would have granted the application, and Justice Stevens would have expedited consideration of
the petition for a writ of certiorari. See id. Eventually, the Court denied certiorari, although Justice White would have
granted it. See 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
32. Despite expectations to the contrary, the Court avoided the issue this term. See Busing: The Next Phase,
Newsweek, Nov. 17, 1986, at 60. Because so many other school districts are in comparable circumstances, however,
review may be inevitable. See id.
33. The response to the desegregation mandate is discussed in II N. DoRsss, P. BENDER, B. NEsosRKs & S. LAW,
PoLmcAL AND CIVIL RIGHS IN THE UNrrD STATES, Ch. XXVIII, 625.43 (1976); A. LwIs, Po'rirr Or A DEC.a 29-59,
102-06, 134-51, 251-58 (1965).
1987] MODERN PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATED SCHOOLS
bly wanting to minimize the divisive potential of its decision, 34 originally relied upon
local officials and courts to implement its mandate. The assignees of that responsi-
bility, however, colluded to breach the Court's trust by ignoring the decree
altogether, 35 devising plans that were ruses, 36 or employing delaying tactics. 37 Some
states adopted a confrontational posture pursuant to state sovereignty principles 38 and
enacted punitive measures encouraging official harassment of civil rights attorneys. 39
Resistance to desegregation was so strong and compliance so slight that, fifteen years
after the Brown decision, delaying tactics and ineffective and insincere efforts
continued to be commonplace responses to the Court's mandate. 40 Where opposition
to unitary schools was especially deep-seated, evasive strategies have continued to
breed, and desegregation even now has become only a partial reality. 41 As the focus
upon segregated schools moved northward and westward, the Court probably
experienced a sense of frustration and constraint upon its power. 42 Having fought
annually the intransigence of one region where segregation was especially overt, and
mandated change was grudgingly slow and incremental, experience may have created
a reluctance to take the desegregation principle a major geographic step further.
34. Given the radical overhaul of constitutional doctrine and effect upon law and custom, the Court must have
known public response would be "electric and widely divergent." A. MASoN, THE SUmsam COURT FROM TAr To WaRsw
207-08 (Rev. ed. 1968). To minimze adverse reaction, the Court limited its holding to the field of education. See Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YoUNo, CONsTnmoNAL LAW 576 (1985).
It also sought cooperation from local officials by relying upon them to desegregate "with all deliberate speed" rather than
overnight. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
Even if the open-ended time table for desegregation was politically calculated, the theory has been advanced that the
decision also was unconsciously racist. The notion, that time might be necessary to convert from a system of official
discrimination (see id. at 299-301), may have reflected the sense that whites should not have to attend integrated schools
until sufficient steps were taken to ensure their quality. See Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, Approach to the Topics, 24
U.C.L.A. L.REv. 581, 600 (1977).
35. Inaction was a viable option because litigation generally was necessary to change the status quo. Congress
eventually tried to discourage delay by authorizing the Justice Department to initiate desegregation suits and denying
federal funds to segregated systems. See N. DosE, P. BENDE, B. NEBORNE & S. LAw, supra note 33, at 633-43.
36. Policies styled as desegregation plans actually were calculated to perpetuate segregation. Popular sham devices
included freedom of choice and transfer plans permitting students to move from schools where they were in a minority
to ones where they would be in a majority. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439-42 (1968); Goss v. Board
of Education, 373 U.S. 683, 686-88 (1963). Even after the Court's demand for immediate, effective remedies, district
lines were gerrymandered to blunt the desegregation mandate. See L. TRtBE, A' acAN CoNsrrrloss.A Law 1036 (1978).
37. Some federal district courts, for instance, refused to hear a desegregation suit until administrative remedies had
been exhausted. See McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963). The Court rejected such a prerequisite to a
hearing. Id. at 676. Nonetheless, the sympathies of the lower courts facilitated official stalling and bad faith. See United
States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 863 (5th Cir. 1966), corrected, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
38. Arkansas, for instance, unsuccessfully attempted to condition the desegregation order upon legislative approval
of it. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1958).
39. A Virginia regulation, which would have disbarred attorneys representing groups with no monetary interest in
the pertinent litigation, was invalidated pursuant to the first amendment. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
40. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1968).
41. Some Southern school boards, for instance, have minimized taxes and underfunded public school systems to
make private academies more affordable and racial separation more feasible. See The Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 4,
1986, at I, col. 1.
42. A decade after the court ordered desegregation, only two percent of black students in the South attended schools
where they were not in the majority. See BUREAU OF THE CENsUs, U.S. DEFRam Trer OF COM.IERcE, STATtSnCAL BsTRAcr OF
THE UTErro STATES 124 (1974). The lack of results was the consequence of deliberate delay and evasion. See United States
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 863 (5th Cir. 1966), corrected, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 840 (1967).
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The Court's original insistence upon the elimination of racially identifiable
schools 43 followed logically its discrediting of the separate but equal doctrine.
Tangible factors, such as facilities, curricula, and teacher qualifications and salaries,
could have been equalized but generally were not.44 The Court, however, concluded
that intangible disparities could not be overcome pursuant to the separate but equal
concept.45 Although the Court recognized public education as an important tool for
self-realization and effectuation of equal opportunity, 46 its findings responded to the
least subtle variation of segregated public education. Legislated separatism may have
been the most identifiable, but it was not the exclusive, cause of segregation. Forces
operating independently or in combination with government-induced demographic
patterns fostered other strains of institutionalized segregation.
Economic growth and related job opportunities from the 1920s onward attracted
increasingly large numbers of blacks into northern and western cities. 47 As the most
egregiously unequal forms of school segregation were being constitutionally chal-
lenged pursuant to a strategy calculated to undermine separatism on a measured and
evolutionary basis, 48 more subtle but equally pernicious varieties were becoming
entrenched not by legislative act but by official action or with official complicity.
Government action or policies directly fostered racially discrete neighborhoods and
effectively created community barriers that could not be crossed. Restrictive
covenants, for instance, were legally enforceable until 1948. 49 Although finally
declared unconstitutional, they, accompanied by government-mandated red-lining
practices, 50 have had lasting consequences in defining housing patterns. 5' Residential
segregation has been exacerbated by official decisions concerning the location of
43. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391
U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
44. In 1954 when Brown I was decided, the average expenditures in southern states for white and black students
were $165 and $115 respectively. See A. LEwis, supra note 33, at 20.
45. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954). The Court had referred to intangible
considerations, or "qualities which are incapable of objective measurement," in finding that a segregated law school and
graduate school could not provide equal educational opportunities. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Reg., 339 U.S. 637
(1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). It concluded that "[sluch considerations apply with added force to
children in grade and high schools." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
46. The Court characterized education as "perhaps the most important functon of state and local
governments . . . [essential to] the performance of our most basic public responsibilites . . . . the very foundation of
good citizenship . . . [and the key to success] in life." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (Brown
1). It thus denominated education as "a right which must be available to all on equal terms." Id. That apparent guarantee
was substantially diluted, however, by the Court's later determination that education was not a fundamental right and that
disparities in educational funding and quality were tolerable. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S.
1, 34-37 (1973).
47. See UNrED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, REN.EcnoNs OF AsERIcA: CoMntr-MoRATINr THE STATISTICAL ABsrRAcr
CENTENNIAL 136-37, Tables I & 11 (1980).
48. See K. RIPPLE, CoNsTrrnoNAL LmOATIoN §§ 4.2-4.3 (1984). The first part of the strategy was to insist upon total
equalization of curricula, physical facilities, and faculty "'on the theory that the extreme cost of maintaining two 'equal'
school systems would eventually destroy segregation." Marshall, An Evaluation of Recent Efforts to Achieve Racial
Integregation in Education Through Resort to the Courts, 21 J. NEGoO Enuc. 316, 318 (1952).
49. The Court determined that enforcement of a restrictive covenant would constitute state action and thus a
violation of the fourteenth amendment. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
50. The Federal Housing Administration formulated policies to protect residential loans from "adverse influences"
upon underlying property. See P. JACOBS, PRELUDE To Rtor. A VIEW OF URBAN AMRIcA FROM THE Borro~i 139-41 (1967).
Such influences included the presence of "racially inharmonious groups." Id. Thus, the federal government played an
active role in institutionalizing residential segregation. See G. MYRDAL, AN AmERIcAN DiLettA 625 (1962).
51. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 216 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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public housing and schools and distribution of urban development funds. 52 In
addition, actual or threatened violence, often aided or abetted by official action or
posture, has further assured racially identifiable neighborhoods. 53
The Court eventually characterized residential segregation as de facto, 54 and
thus constitutionally tolerable. It is difficult, however, to see how the line of
responsibility between official intent and consequence has ever been broken.
Assertions that it is simplistic to attribute demographic changes to racist attitudes 55
themselves reflect naivete, if not a repressed sense of reality. No satisfactory
alternative explanation has been advanced for persistently static demographic patterns
in a highly mobile society or the resettlement process invariably triggered by a
desegregation order. 56 Segregation in the North may have presented a different face,
but it was no less official. 57 Unlike in the South, where legislation and custom
required separation, "institutional segregation in the North" depended upon residen-
tial separation. 58 Because the northern strain added geographical distance and
isolation to separation, it perhaps created an even less tractable problem than in the
South where a symbiotic economic relationship evolved making distance more
"ceremonial" than spatial. 59
Separation fostered by official practices and policies was exacerbated by two
forces that, although racially neutral, have altered the social matrix to the extent that
what could have been a sweeping constitutional mandate now may be read very
narrowly. Enhanced personal mobility and suburban development provided oppor-
tunities, in the post-Brown period, to resettle in newly created communities and
52. See id.; Karst, Not One Law at Rome and Another at Athens: The Fourteenth Amendment in Nationwide
Application, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 383, 388-89.
53. See, e.g., W. TrrEn, JR., RACE Rior. CHicAO [s mE RED Su.i.miER or 1919 157-83 (1970); S. DRAra & H.
Cm-roN, BLAcK Mmroous 174-82 (1945). The Court thus made segregation, descending directly from racial separation
that was mandated and perpetuated by force of law or specter of violence, constitutionally acceptable. State action and
offical purpose concepts are thus sterile legalisms as they would operate not in response to the wholesale intimidations
by a community but only the acts of its elected agents.
Gender-based harassment by public employees creates working conditions that deny equal protection even absent
traditional proof of direct purposeful official discrimination. See Bohen v. City of East Chicago, Indiana, 799 F.2d 1180,
1185-87 (7th Cir. 1986); cf. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986). Segregated housing patterns
resulting from abusive community and societal pressures should be regarded no differently for equal protection purposes.
Consistent with the notion that racial classifications are subject to the strictest scrutiny and least countenanced by the equal
protection clause, the argument for a constitutional violation is even stronger in the racial harassment context than in the
gender harassment one.
54. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976). See generally Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205-08 (1973).
55. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 485 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). The decision of
whites to flee from an influx of blacks seems more akin to the sentiments inclining downtown merchants to use buzzer
lock systems on their doors during hours of operation. Such a system enables proprietors to deny access to all blacks
pursuant to fears that they are generally inclined toward criminal activity. See, The Washington Post, Sept. 7, 1986
(Magazine), at 34. For an examination of the racist perceptions and thought patterns underlying that and similar behavior,
see Lawrence, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
56. The argument, for instance, that residential segregation is attributable to income differences is undercut by the
economic heterogeneity of most neighborhoods. "If people were residentially distributed according to the value of the
housing they can afford, instead of according to skin color, levels of residential segregation would be low." Farley,
Residential Segregation and its Implications for School Integration, LAw & Co'rraup. PRoss. 164, 174-75 (Winter 1975).
57. See G. M7RDAL, AN A. EmcAN DILEMIA 618 (1944).
58. See id.
59. See id. at 621.
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attend newly built schools. 60 Families that could afford moving to suburbia often did
so with government assistance. 61 Left behind was a shrinking tax base, consequently
deteriorating conditions, and a growing incentive for others to flee when the means
became available to do so. 62 Because wealth lines generally tracked racial lines, and
the broader equalization consequences which the Brown Court contemplated 63 had
such little time in which to unfold, equal protection goals in part were subverted by
a movement toward better funded, largely white suburban schools and underfunded,
largely black city schools. 64
Despite the ties between racial separation and official action that transcended
regional boundaries, the Court during the 1970s largely exempted the North and West
from the equal protection decree pursuant to the notion of de facto segregation. 65
What were presented as constitutional lines of distinction actually may have been
embraced as boundaries of convenience reflecting the Court's sense that it could not
compel extensive desegregation in a society disposed toward functional if not official
segregation. 66
The de facto principle essentially operates as a liability limiting concept
conditioning equal protection remedies upon the showing that segregation is the
proximate result of purposeful official action. 67 Because identification of a termina-
tion point for official responsibility necessitates a subjective reading of cause and
effect, the formula invites criticism of its potential for constitutional treachery. Given
widespread, recent, and manifest official contributions toward segregation in the
North and West, the Court's introduction of the de facto principle might be
characterized less as a hard decision recognizing shadings of cause and effect than as
a procrustean inclination to disregard cause and effect altogether. Following more
60. UNrrE STATES BJREAu OF THE CENsus, REFLECTIONS F AMEaCA: CoMIEm. oAnNO THE STATistcAL ABsIRACT
CENTENNIAL, 136-37 & Tables I and 11 (1980).
61. See supra note 50.
62. Such resettlement typifies "white flight," a process by which "wealthier whites . . . immunize...
themselves from desegregation remedies that less wealthy groups have been unable to avoid." L. TRIBE, Aur:mc.
CoNsTITroNAL LAw 1042 (1978).
63. The Court, concluding that the separate but equal doctrine would not produce equalization, assumed that a
racially integrated setting would afford equal educational opportunities. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,
493-95 (1954). Fixed attitudes, however, may deny such opportunities even in an integrated context. See infra note 175
and accompanying text.
64. In two of Ohio's largest cities-Cincinnati and Columbus-for instance, average per student expenditures
amount to $3,000 contrasted with $4,000 in nearby suburbs. See STATE OF Omo, DEARiENTr OF EOtCATION, CoSTS PER PVu.,
Table 1, at 5, 7-8 and Table 2, at 28, 30-31 (1984-85).
65. The de facto concept presumed that much segregation was not the consequence, or at least the proximate result
of, official actions and thus did not implicate equal protection concerns. "IP]urpose or intent to segregate
[became] . . . the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation." Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (emphasis in original). Ascertaining segregative intent when not facial,
however, is a "tortuous effort" that may be no more productive than guesswork. Id. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring and
dissenting). See also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 219-22 (1971).
66. The Supreme Court has characterized demographic change in the years immediately following a desegregation
order as a "quite normal pattern of human migration." Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436
(1976). The perception seems consonant with the notion that white flight and persistent segregated housing patterns are
the result of deeply embedded social, economic, and demographic forces. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. 449, 481-82 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
67. It is analogous to the concept of proximate cause in the sense that liability for the consequences of an act does
not extend forever. The problem, however, is identifying a fair and reasonable cut-off point.
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than fifteen years of fierce regional resistance to desegregation, 68 and portents of like
or even worse reaction if desegregation were forced upon communities elsewhere, 69
the de facto notion afforded a handy if not convincing premise for discounting official
actions and policies that have fostered racially separate schools. 70
Left beyond the purview of equal protection, therefore, were those injuries
caused by improper motives that could be hidden or otherwise difficult to discern. 71
Adoption of the de facto concept also represented a decision to limit the ambit of the
equal protection guarantee to calculated discrimination and thus exclude the less
visible but equally harmful and more pertinent forms of unconscious racial aversion.
The notion of de facto segregation largely ignores the centrality of race consciousness
and aversion in "our common historical experience, and, therefore, our
* . .culture. ' '72 Because they are assimilated uncritically early in life, 73 attitudes
toward race are difficult to unlearn and difficult to acknowledge. Although uncon-
sciously held, their potential for harm is undiminished. Even if consciously aware
that it is "wrong" to judge a person on the basis of race, cultural conditioning
produces stereotypes that influence decisions and foster separatism. Conditioned
expectations that white neighbors will be quieter, cleaner, and more dependable and
concerned with property, for instance, engender the conclusion that they will be
better neighbors. 74 Given conscious recognition of the legal and moral wrongness of
judging persons on the basis of race, it is unlikely that many would acknowledge that
racial considerations affected their decision on where to live. Enduring separation
suggests otherwise and intimates that race continues to be a powerful, albeit
repressed, concern. Although harm is identical whether motive is conscious or
unconscious, the de facto concept effectively places constitutionally off-limits those
variants of segregation which have become most pervasive and persistent.
The conditioning of the duty to desegregate upon what the Court regards as a
satisfactory showing of discriminatory intent75 prefaced what has become for many
school systems virtual constitutional immunity from the equal protection dictates of
1954. Consistent with the de facto principle, the Court concluded that interdistrict
remedies would not be required unless state or suburban officials actively and
63. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
69. Northern opposition to desegregation is long-standing, deep-seated, and has been characterized as hypocritical.
See 1 18 Coxo. Rac. 5455 (1972) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff).
70. School district lines that split racially distinct systems must inevitably be perceived as officially structured
dividing lines, and causation-rooted doctrine does little to alter that perception. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
804-05 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); A. BicK.L, THE SUPR'ass COURT AND TIE IDEA OF PRORESS 119 (1970) (if a "child
perceives his separation as discriminatory and invidious, he is not, in a society a hundred years removed from slavery,
going to make fine distinctions about the source of a particular separation"). The setting of constitutional guarantees
according to whether a child is "born into a defacto society" is thus troublesome. See Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep.
School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 1972) (en bane) (quoting United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380
F.2d 385, 397 (5th Cir.) (Gewin, J., dissenting)), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
71. See infra note 155.
72. Lawrence, supra note 17, at 330.
73. See M. Gooo.rUN, RAcE AwARENEss FN YOsNG CMLwLN 36-60 (1952).
74. Cf. Lawrence, supra note 17, at 343 (employer guided by cultural stereotypes "perceives white job applicant
as more articulate, collegial, thoughtful or charismatic").
75. Accord Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-41 (1976). See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189,
208 (1973).
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proximately had facilitated segregation. 76 In Milliken v. Bradley,77 the Court not only
articulated that limiting principle, but reversed the trial court's finding that the state
and nearby communities had contributed purposefully and substantially to the
segregation of the Detroit city schools. 78 It thus revoked an interdistrict remedy that
was inconsonant with the de facto formulation. 79 Because creation of a new district
can bring immunity from desegregation, 80 incentives for purposeful gerrymandering
or manipulation of district lines is diminished. Still, a central purpose of the
desegregation mandate was to eliminate invidious racial distinctions of formal racial
segregation. 8' To the extent residential housing patterns reflect or descend from
race-based aversions, 82 such distinctions persist. By disfavoring interdistrict reme-
dies, the Court itself has facilitated their survival. 83
It followed from the de facto concept, at least as a legalism, that the duty to
desegregate abated once a unitary system was found to have been effectuated and
official segregation eradicated. The conclusion, that desegregation responsibilities
are transient rather than enduring, 84 betokened an additional revision in equal
protection terms and tools. The Court's decision in Pasadena City Board of
Education v. Spangler$5 raised the question whether, as a constitutional matter,
desegregation can be effectuated and integration maintained in a meaningful and
enduring fashion. Until recently, largely because of the evasion and default of
legislators and school administrators, 86 the judiciary shouldered primary responsibil-
ity for progress in school desegregation. 87 Consistent with a sense that state-enforced
segregation largely has been eliminated, or that additional coercion is self-defeat-
ing, 88 responsibility for effectuation of desegregation and maintenance of integrega-
76. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746-47 (1974). The Court found no right "to attend a unitary school
system . . . [u]nless petitioners drew the district lines in a discriminatory fashion, or arranged for white students in the
[city] to attend schools in [the suburbs]." Id. In so doing, it overturned findings by the district court of intentional
segregative action. See id. at 725-27, 734-35 n.16, 770-71 (White, J., dissenting).
77. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
78. Id. at 746-47. Both the "District Court and the Court of Appeals found that over a long period of years those
in charge of the Michigan public schools engaged in various practices calculated to effect the segregation of the Detroit
school system." Id. at 762 (White, J., dissenting).
79. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
80. Justice Marshall observed that, by denying a meaningful remedy, the Court afforded "no remedy at
all . . . [thus] guaranteeing that Negro children ... will receive the same separate and inherently unequal education in
the future as they have been unconstitutionally afforded in the past." Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 782 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1973); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S.
431, 435 (1968).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 49-59.
83. "IT]he growing concentration of blacks in central cities, and the almost exclusively white school populations
in the suburban rings, means that court orders directed only to the central city will have limited impact." Farley, supra
note 56, at 192.
84. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971).
85. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
86. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. For a more detailed examination of the Court's assertive
desegregation philosophy and strategy, preceding the major limiting principles which emerged in the 1970s, see S. VAsBV,
A. D'AmATo & R. MERALER, DEsEEGAO-noi FRoo BROWN To ALEXANDER (1977).
88. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 481 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[the type of
state-enforced segregation that Brown I properly condemned no longer exists in this country").
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tion has been transferred to the governmental bodies that, in the past, proved
unresponsive to equal protection demands. 89
Even if official commitment to segregation is a relic, it would probably be
unrealistic, given a representative process, to expect that future policy-making will
not favor majority preferences and instincts. The Court may be criticized for
disjoining modem segregation from official action, 90 but it is increasingly apparent
that constitutional duties to alter such conditions are diminishing, if not vanishing
altogether. 9' Absent a response to that new order, racially identifiable schools may be
as much a part of the future as they were of the past.
III. DESEGREGATION: A PRELUDE TO RESEGREGATION AND A NEW
MAJORITARIANISM
The desegregation mandate originally rested upon the premise that race-
consciousness should be displaced by color-blindness. 92 A central irony of new
desegregation and integration policies is their race-sensitivity. 93 Although a duty may
still exist to eliminate racially identifiable schools that are the product of official
discriminatory intent, 94 the Court has become increasingly disinclined to find such
ties. 95 Modem school segregation has instead been depicted as the consequence of
"familiar segregated housing patterns ... caused by social, economic, and demo-
graphic forces for which no school board is responsible. ' '96
If that characterization betrays a notion that residential segregation is constitu-
tionally permissible insofar as it reflects standard behavior, the underlying reasoning
89. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text. The transfer of responsibility is consonant with a "now widely
accepted view that . . . the federal judiciary should be limiting rather than expanding the extent to which courts are
operating the public school systems of our country." Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 480 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
90. See, e.g., Abramowitz & Jackson, Desegregation: Where Do We Go From Here?, 19 How. L.J. 92, 93 (1975).
91. The duty to desegregate ends when a unitary system is effectuated. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v.
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971).
92. The objective was to dismantle racially identifiable schools and create unitary schools. See, e.g., Alexander v.
Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam).
93. Affirmative plans to effectuate desegregation or preserve integration necessitate attention to numbers, quotas,
and formulas for effectuating racial balance. See, e.g., Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986); Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 738 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1984).
Even magnet school plans may include enrollment limits to ensure racial balance. See Kansas City Times, Nov. 13, 1986,
at Al, Col. 1, (Metro Edit.).
94. Actually proving discriminatory intent is a difficult assignment. See infra notes 131-34, 159-60 and
accompanying text. Because "reliable evidence of subjective intentions is seldom obtainable, resort to inference based on
objective factors is generally unavoidable." Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 283 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Otherwise, routine decisions regarding school sitings and closings, attendance zones, neighborhood policies,
faculty hiring, assignment, promotion, transfer policies, curriculum, educational tracks, and social, recreational, and
athletic policies, may be subject to scrutiny. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 234-35 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Still, the inquiry may not be particularly revealing. See Goodman, De Facto School
Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAuF. L. Rav. 275, 284-85 (1972).
95. The Court's finding that the Columbus and Dayton, Ohio schools were officially segregated represents the
exception rather than the rule since the de facto concept was adopted. Its analysis in those cases was criticized sharply
as being "remarkably insensitive to the now widely accepted view that a quarter of a century after Brown .... the
federal judiciary should be limiting rather than expanding . . . [its role in ] operating the public school systems of our
country." Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 479-80 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 480; see also Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976).
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ignores the deeper cause of racially identifiable neighborhoods 97 and accepts racism
as a norm. Insofar as it means that a school board should be held harmless for
segregation that it did not cause, 98 the characterization merits criticism for being too
narrowly focused. Even if bound by the strictures of having to identify official
responsibility for racial separateness and inequality, it seems reasonable to expect that
the arm of government most able to afford a remedy should be the most responsive.
Given the difficulty of reversing residential segregation, albeit acknowledging the
distance and alienation resulting from that condition, compounded by the stresses and
distractions of inner city life, schools may be the most practical instruments for
undoing harm attributable to official action. Limiting their remedial utility to
conditions they alone have created, therefore, reflects an arbitrary charting of
responsibility reflecting a dissociated perception of official action.
The Court's experience with compulsory desegregation, especially during the
1950s and 1960s, may have contributed to the sense that forceful remedies subverted
equal protection objectives. Justice Powell observed that "in city after city [forced
integration has fostered] [t]he process of resegregation, stimulated by resentment
against judicial coercion.' 99 One might more perceptively assert that segregation
recurred because the underlying causes of racial aversion were not addressed and
unconscious motive thus has a constitutionally unimpaired rein. For many years the
Court refused to factor in resentment of or resistance to desegregation as mitigating
forces in the crafting of constitutional policy. 10 Even now, courts assert that the
Constitution cannot bend to popular will.' 01 Yet, it was the Court itself during the
1970s that, while not facially deferring to separatist instincts, afforded them
constitutional living space.102
Persisting or recurring segregation is an expanding reality with a demonstrated
capacity to preclude or reverse equal protection accomplishments. Because education
has come to be regarded as something less than a fundamental right, 0 3 the
entrenchment of modem segregation minus even the overt equalization requirement
that preceded the desegregation mandate is especially troublesome. To the extent
contemporary racial separation is accompanied by increasing social, governmental,
and corporate divestment in inner cities and investment in the suburbs, the practical
97. See supra notes 54-64, 72-75 and accompanying text.
98. Id.
99. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 483 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 492 (1972); Davis v. East Baton Rouge
Parrish School Bd., 721 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983).
101. See, e.g., Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 627 F. Supp. 814, 822 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 784 F.2d 521 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
102. By adopting the de facto distinction, sanctifying school district lines, and making the duty to desegregate
temporal rather than permanent, the Court identified the means by which separation could be perpetuated consonant with
the Constitution.
103. The Brown Court recognized education as an important individual and social interest. 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954). Later, however, it declared that education was not a fundamental right. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-37 (1973). Because segregation that is not state-imposed does not evoke strict scrutiny,
resegregation might evade even the analysis required by the second half of the separate but equal doctrine. See id. But
see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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consequences may be indistinguishable from those pursuant to the separate but equal
doctrine.
If the duty to desegregate has expired or never existed, a central issue is not what
school districts must do to satisfy constitutional standards, but whether and how they
can be encouraged to promote racial diversity, balance, and equality. Constitutional
concerns and duties tied to Brown and its progeny are now pertinent only if official
policies have been adopted that intentionally facilitate segregation.' 0 4 Because the
risk of mandatory desegregation may be minimized by official inaction, a separatist
agenda may be promoted by do-nothing inclinations. Plans that mandate racial
balance, whether crafted voluntarily or required by the state, nonetheless have
emerged and merit serious constitutional attention. Such policies may respond to
underlying stereotypes and majoritarian concerns, including those to which the Court
in the 1950s and 1960s refused to cater.' 0 5 If so, and especially to the extent such
policies raise issues of stigmatization and harm to psyche and educational opportunity
no less profound than those confronting the Brown I Court, issues of unconscious
racism should be addressed.
In the name of integration maintenance, school boards have discontinued or
substantially modified busing plans' 0 6 and reintroduced neighborhood school con-
cepts that would have been unacceptable during the mandatory desegregation
interval.10 7 Contrary to the original objective of eliminating racially identifiable
schools, the return to single-race facilities may be a central feature of integration
maintenance. Such a reversion may reflect an official sense that controls upon racial
mixing are necessary to stem accelerated movement of white students from public
schools.' 0 8
In Brooklyn, New York, for instance, where the white student population had
declined from 94.2% in 1957 to 36.4% in 1981, school officials adopted a freedom
of choice plan which allowed students from an all-minority high school to attend
other high schools in Queens'0 9 and later anywhere in New York." l0 As white
attrition continued, the all-minority school was converted into a receiving institution
and became destined for eventual closure." ' Because white students continued to exit
city schools, further destabilizing desegregation efforts, official policy was increas-
104. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976).
105. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (per curiam); Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. Prince Edward County Bd. of Educ., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Board
of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963); McNeese v. Board of Education 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1 (1958).
106. See Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 525 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
107. Id. In 1968 the Court invalidated a freedom of choice plan that essentially perpetuated neighborhood schools.
See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968). It did not hold that such a plan would never be acceptable
but concluded that a system, when required to desegregate, must use the speediest and most effective means. Id. at
439-40. Schools that have desegregated, therefore, can refer to the Court's harder-line cases in justifying a return to
neighborhood school concepts.
108. Concern over accelerated movement of whites from the Norfolk schools was cited as a reason for adopting a
plan that would make one-third of the city's elementary schools more than 70% black. See Riddick v. School Bd. of
Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 527 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
109. See Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 710 (2d Cir. 1979).
110. Id. at 711.
I 1l. A "'receiving school" is one that has an admissions policy transcending attendance zones. Id. at 711-12.
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ingly directed toward addressing white sensitivities. The pursuit of racial balance thus
became governed by concern that, if minority enrollment in certain receiving schools
was perceived by whites as proceeding too rapidly, they would leave at a faster rate."12
By imposing controls upon the rate and extent of racial change at receiving
schools, the plan contemplated a transfer of minority students that would be
sufficiently gradual to avoid fostering district-wide resegregation. 1 3 Inherent in such
constraints upon entry into racially diverse schools were limitations upon exit from
racially identifiable schools. 114 The plan's viability, therefore, was tied directly to
perpetuation of single-race schools and a system of racial preferences. Unlike
traditional affirmative action schemes, however, the burden fell not upon members of
the majority but upon the victims of past discrimination who were denied transfers to
mixed schools." 15
Another system of racially identifiable schools characterizes an integration
maintenance plan adopted by Norfolk city officials and challenged in Riddick. 1 6
Unlike New York, where school integration had voluntarily been adopted as state
policy, Norfolk schools had been desegregated by court order in 1971- fifteen years
after litigation was commenced. 117 Four years later, the school system was declared
unitary" I8 and resegregation, unless found to be the product of official discrimination,
became constitutionally permissible.
Like other cities forced to desegregate, Norfolk experienced a general loss of
population"19 and decline in white enrollments highly disproportionate to that in black
enrollments. 20 Claiming that its purpose was to minimize white flight, the school
board reintroduced neighborhood schools for elementary students' 2' who, assuming
the plan worked, would be fed into racially mixed junior and senior high schools. 22
The trial court noted that public sentiment could not obstruct or dilute the obligation
to dismantle an officially segregated dual school system. 2 3 Nonetheless, it concluded
that white flight might be factored into voluntary efforts to improve racial balance. 24
112. A "Controlled Rate of Change Plan" was introduced to balance integration objectives "against the perceived
reality that if the minority enrollment in an individual receiving school increased too rapidly or reached a critical absolute
level (the so-called 'tipping point'), white students would leave the receiving school at an increasing rate." Parent Ass'n
of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 738 F.2d 573, 576 (1984).
113. Id.
114. Black and Hispanic student thus could not enroll in schools where their attendance would decrease the white
to minority balance by four percent in a year or make white enrollment dip below a 50% tipping point. Id. at 577.
115. Because white enrollments in the system were low, "one group of minority students [could] be kept in stable
integrated schools only at the cost of requiring another group of minority students to remain in largely or exclusively
all-minority schools." Id. at 581 n.9 (citing Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705,
717-19 (2d Cir. 1979)).
116. Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 627 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986). See also supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
117. Id. at 816-17.
118. Id. at 818-19.
119. Norfolk's population in 1970 was 307,951 and in 1980 was 266,979. Id. at 817.
120. White enrollments from 1970 to 1983 decreased from 32,586 to 13,327, while black enrollments decreased
from 24,244 to 20,681. Id.
121. The creation of single attendance zone schools was accompanied by a majority-minority transfer option so that
a student "did not have to attend a school in which his race constitutes more than 70% of the student body." Id. at 818.
122. Id. at 818.
123. Id. at 823.
124. Id. at 824.
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Unless and until the Court finds otherwise, the Riddick decision provides
authority for allowing school officials to curtail busing and reintroduce neighborhood
schools' 25 and is relevant to a multitude of communities. 126 Like the Brooklyn plan,
Norfolk's policy was crafted in response to white flight and its perceived destabilizing
effect upon a mixed school system.' 27 Concern for majoritarian preferences, which
was earlier found unacceptable as a basis for evading desegregation, t28 for now may
be alluded to as a predicate for integration maintenance.
Freedom of choice plans adopted immediately after Brown were found uncon-
stitutional because they did not actually result in the dismantling of dual school
systems.129 If racially identifiable neighborhood schools become the norm after a
desegregation interval, however, Brown may have merely suspended rather than
eliminated the old order. Determination of future unconstitutionality, absent a
doctrinal change, will be a much more treacherous process than in the past.' 30
Discriminatory purpose and thus denial of equal protection were manifest when
segregation was calculated.' 3' To the extent official action is not overtly discrimi-
natory, unconstitutional purpose becomes elusive. 132 In the 1960s, the Court could
conclude that a desegregation plan's failure to work "after three years of operation"
sufficiently demonstrated that it was a ruse. 133 Integration maintenance plans cannot
be evaluated so readily. To the extent they are predicated upon gradual change and
rely upon concepts such as feeder systems, 34 their efficacy must be assessed from a
longitudinal perspective.
Contemporary equal protection dogma includes the notion that, if court-ordered
desegregation has been complied with in good faith, "it's time to restore to local
authorities full responsibility for running their public schools." 135 Modern schooling,
however, is not far removed in time from official discrimination, nor is de facto
segregation as detached from official action as the Court might wish. As persisting or
recurring separation suggests, the prohibition of official segregation did not alter as
much as it repressed the forces of racial aversion.
Race-conscious policies may be offered with the justification that limited
segregation is preferable to total segregation. To the extent racial preferences are
central to desegregation effectuation and integration maintenance, vexing constitu-
125. The Norfolk case is considered significant because it could "prompt an end to busing in as many as 150 school
districts." Busing: The Next Phase, Newsweek, Nov. 17, 1986, at 60, col. 1.
126. See id.
127. Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 627 F. Supp. 814, 816 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
128. See United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1972).
129. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. Prince Edward County Bd. of Educ.,
377 U.S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
130. To the extent segregation is not facially mandated, identification of constitutionally impermissible intent is a
"tortuous effort." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 224 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
131. See supra note 52.
132. Id.
133. Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 532 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
134. See supra notes 112-13, 122, and accompanying text
135. See, e.g., Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983). See generally Columbus
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 480-89 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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tional concerns must be addressed. 136 A reciprocal of racial preference may be racial
aversion. Insofar as the New York and Norfolk policies respond to the former, they
may respond to the latter. If stigmatization or harm to psyche or educational
opportunity is an enduring equal protection concern, such craftings ultimately must
be measured accordingly.
IV. DESEGREGATION EFFECTUATION AND INTEGRATION MAINTENANCE IN THE
1980s AND BEYOND
The revised lesson of 1954, as the Court has instructed, 137 is that the
Constitution does not countenance state-enforced segregation. Two companion
discoveries are (1) the desegregation mandate has not resulted in pervasive or
enduring desegregation, and (2) equal protection must be pursued "in a world in
which human conduct, often self-seeking and sometimes sordid, as well as the
realities of nature, limits our options." 13 8
Judicial intervention in the educational process, to secure equal protection
interests, has been a constant source of resentment. The Court has been criticized for
displacing the judgment of elected officials and professional educators and interfering
with the authority and discretion of parents who, losing confidence in public schools,
will send their children elsewhere. 139 Popular notions have emerged that an active
judicial role in promoting equal protection objectives actually sacrifices them. 140
Given emerging majoritarian-sensitive policies that are overtly and consciously tied
to race, however, exacting review cannot be bypassed absent an abdication of
responsibility to assess the constitutionality or the vitiation of the dictates and spirit
of Brown.
A. New Dimensions and Problems in Affirmative Action
When school officials assign students to neighborhood schools as part of a
race-conscious plan 14 or set rate and extent of change constraints,142 they use racial
preferences or quotas. The Court has approved such concepts insofar as they are
necessary to eliminate vestiges of state imposed segregation.143 Mandatory busing,
for instance, was endorsed as an essential methodology for effectuating racial balance
and thus unitary schools. 144 To the extent that preferences and quotas are employed
in a voluntary plan, however, they raise more complex affirmative action issues.145
136. Controls upon the number and rate of minority transfers, such as those in Brooklyn, constitute a scheme of
racial quotas or preferences.
137. See supra notes 54-91 and accompanying text.
138. Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 581, 718 (2d Cir. 1979).
139. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 484 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 483-84.
141. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362-63 (1978) (citing decisions approving
race-based remedies to remedy effects of past discrimination).
144. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1971).
145. See infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text,
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The concept of using race-conscious remedies to redress injury from past
discrimination is not novel, but it raises special concerns when part of a majoritarian-
sensitive integration plan. Limiting mechanisms tied to promoting equal protection
values are different from those that overtly breach them. Preferences or controls
nonetheless evoke disquieting concern regarding whether they actually are "be-
nign." 1 46 Their operation has engendered general concern to the extent they might
impose burdens upon individuals to advance a group's general interest. 147 Restric-
tions on minority transfers to mixed schools1 48 feed that worry. Insofar as they limit
opportunity, and in so doing accede to senses of racial aversion, the underlying
thinking is worrisome and even reminiscent of that associated with the separate but
equal doctrine.149 If a "measure of inequity ... [exists] in forcing innocent
persons ... to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making,"'' 50 a
seemingly greater inequity exists when the innocent person belongs to the victimized
group. Considering the recency of overt discrimination and persistence of segregation
as the result of subtle or unconscious mental processes, concern that preferences
might subvert equal protection objectives is probably reasonable. 51
Given modem curbs upon the desegregation formula, preferences or quotas may
seem especially alluring if presented as a mechanism essential for ensuring partial
integration and preventing complete segregation.' 52 Although such methodologies
have evoked criticism for "stand[ing] integration on its head," 153 the vitality of the
de facto concept and unavailability of interdistrict remedies lend practical support to
claims that policies selectively burdening minorities may be essential for maximizing
integration and ensuring "[tlhe greatest good for the greatest number of people." 154
Even if offered as a means for promoting integration, official policy may stigmatize,
injure psychological well-being, and impair educational opportunity. Plans formu-
lated in response to majoritarian aversions essentially validate those disinclinations.
The Court itself has expressed general concern that racial preference schemes
may actually burden individuals in the group whose interests purportedly are to be
advanced. 55 The operation of majoritarian-sensitive integration policies heightens
146. The term "benign" is used to describe a classification intended to promote rather than burden equal protection
interests.
147. See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
148. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978).
149. The Court's conclusion that states could mandate separate but equal facilities in part reflected worries
concerning "the preservation of the public peace and good order." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).
150. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978).
151. Id. at 298, 331-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. Such claims have been presented to the Supreme Court. See supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
Norfolk school officials maintained that, without their controverted integration maintenance plan, "the system would be
751 black by 1987." Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521,526 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
A total exodus of white students, and continuing unavailability of interdistrict remedies, may make desegregation
effectuation and integration maintenance impossible absent voluntary solutions or incentives. See Farley, supra note 56,
at 192.
153. J. Nowss, R. RoTUNDA & J. YouNG, Co.,srITutoNAL LAw 604 (1985).
154. Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 719 (1979). See Riddick v. School
Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 543 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
155. Worries that racial preferences reinforce stereotyping and are demeaning, for instance, would seem less
operative. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 531-32 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298, & 360 (1978). Concern that preferences may reinforce stereotypes, by intimating that
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that risk. Insofar as official action defers to racial aversion, minorities are not only
burdened but are effectively made responsible for wrongs committed against them.
Resorting to concepts that place upon victims of discrimination a heavy burden for
rectifying wrongdoing may be an inevitable consequence of a squelched desegrega-
tion mandate. Such an allocation, moreover, seems to have been neither foreign nor
fatal even to the original desegregation concept. Generational sacrifice, for instance,
was contemplated and countenanced by the desegregation strategy itself. Because
protracted litigation was foreseeable, it was understood that plaintiffs and their
contemporaries would not reap the educational fruits of their efforts.' 5 6 For them,
equal protection delayed was equal protection denied. Given much less rigorous equal
protection demands by the Court now than in the past, it may be unrealistic to expect
minimal burdens upon the purported beneficiaries of new policies.
Concern that victims of segregation may be unconscionably burdened by
majoritarian-sensitive practices, however, is probably well-founded. Plans that cater
to majoritarian preferences may service majoritarian interests which, during the equal
protection guarantee's history, have largely consisted of preserving racial separation
and distance. To the extent desegregation principles have been declared self-
defeating, equal protection concepts have failed both before and since 1954. As noted
before, acceptable modem segregation and intolerable past segregation are merely
variant consequences of the cultural conditioning that induces racial aversion. The
Brown Court recognized past doctrinal failures, and revised equal protection thinking
accordingly. Precedent, not to mention need, thus exists for additional reworking
pursuant to recognition of present doctrinal failures. Pursuit of equal protection
objectives in a post-desegregation context may require accommodation of competing
majority and minority interests. The negation of racial aversion as a barrier to
effectuation of equal protection guarantees, however, may necessitate not merely
affixing convenient labels to variants of segregation but confronting their common
cause.
B. Escaping the Discriminatory Intent Trap
A prerequisite to elevated review, in an equal protection context, is proof of
discriminatory intent.' 57 Policies, especially to the extent that they are crafted by
officials who are elected by a majority and thus are likely to be responsive to
majoritarian sentiments, may prove inconsonant with announced equal protection
objectives. Heightened scrutiny, which has attracted criticism in other affirmative
action contexts, 58 might theoretically protect legitimate equal protection interests
beneficiaries would be unable to succeed on merit, is an especially unconvincing rationale in any context. To the extent
success of white males can be tied generically to better connections and reduced competition from females and minorities,
a demeaning stereotype emerges that may be dependent upon affirmative action for its eradication. Nor would minorities
be afforded special status at the expense of the majority. The absence of any special privilege would help offset or dilute
concerns not only with respect to unwanted stereotypes but to burdens imposed upon purportedly innocent persons.
156. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 862 (5th Cir. 1966), corrected, 380 F.2d
385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Abramowitz & Jackson, supra note 90, at 92-93.
157. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
158. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986) (equal protection denied by collective
[Vol. 48:117
MODERN PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATED SCHOOLS
when official policy reflects or facilitates majoritarian aversions. So far, however, it
has failed to operate as a barrier to emerging majoritarian sensitive plans.
The Court has suggested several criteria for determining whether an impermis-
sible intent exists. However, most of them are patently inadequate. Consideration of
racially discriminatory impact, history, specific prior events, departures from usual
procedures, and contemporaneous statements of decision-makers 59 has not been
especially helpful in ferreting out discriminatory intent in any circumstance.
Discriminatory purpose can too easily be disguised or obscured. 160 History and past
events are largely irrelevant to the extent that many suburban communities have no
discrete past to focus upon or modem segregation is regarded as a "normal pattern"
rather than symptomatic of a more profound cultural force. Consonant with such
perceptions, modem race-conscious pupil assignments have been regarded as the
consequence of residence rather than racial classification.161
Given a binding intent requirement, pragmatic incentives exist to continue
attempting to demonstrate the linkage between diverse forms of government action
and modem segregation. If this connection were finally acknowledged, architects of
new policies would at least be expected to demonstrate that their policies are
workable and free from discriminatory purpose.
Whether policies that defer to majority preferences can work practically and
constitutionally in the long run is at best debatable. To the extent that approval of
them endorses racial aversion, it may reinforce racist patterns within the culture. The
same harms found unacceptable when attributed to the separate but equal doctrine
thus may be countenanced.
The very existence of a discriminatory intent prerequisite, as noted earlier, has
evoked extensive criticism. Debate has largely been framed as a choice between a
discriminatory motive and a discriminatory effect standard. 162 Examination of
majoritarian-sensitive, race-conscious policies not only affords an opportunity to
reconsider whether those choices are the only ones available, it also invites appraisal
of whether either is relevant for assessing modem variants of segregation. Insofar as
those strains are primarily the product of unconscious rather than conscious
inclination, a strong argument exists that the intent requirement is obsolete. A major
obstacle to its abandonment, however, is fear that the alternative, a discriminatory
impact requirement, would disrupt the legislative process by risking the validity of a
"whole range of [existing] tax, welfare, public service, regulatory and licensing
statutes." 163
bargaining agreement providing preferences for minorites in the event of lay-offs). To the extent that racial preferences
are legislated or collectively bargained for, and majority interest thus adequately represented, a compelling argument
exists for judical review that is less exacting than if the burden falls upon groups traditionally excluded from or
underrepresented in the political process. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 341-42 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 109-10 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
159. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 257, 266-68 (1977).
160. See Lawrence, supra note 55, at 319. See also supra note 94.
161. See Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 540 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
162. See, e.g., Colloquium on Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DiEGO L.
REv. 925 (1978).
163. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 249 n.14 (1976).
1987]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
By choosing another mode of analysis altogether, and focusing upon the cultural
meaning of an official action, 164 the Court might abandon one badly flawed standard
without having to embrace another. Such a test would not be alien to constitutional
analysis.165 It will be difficult for a court to determine whether a culture attaches racial
significance to a policy, but certainly no more difficult than determining discriminatory
intent. Although formal segregation would be strictly scrutinized pursuant to either
test, the cultural significance of acts contributing to residential segregation might have
strengthened the case for heightened rather than deferential review of the school
desegregation cases of the 1970s. Insofar as modem policies cater to majoritarian
concerns and aversions regarding race, exacting review would follow and government
would have to present a compelling justification. Because a discriminatory intent
standard has led to insurmountable barriers against equal protection relief, and does
not even measure unconscious motivation, a new test for calibrating the appropriate
level of judicial review may be indispensable for security against modem wrongs.
C. Moving Ahead Toward Equal Educational Opportunity and Non-Stigmatizing
Policies: Short-Term and Long-Term Agendas
It should not be surprising that a society, which so recently accepted official
segregation and even now regards white flight immediately following a desegregation
order as a "normal pattern of human migration," remains strongly influenced by
racial consciousness. Nor should it be surprising that, despite prohibition of official
segregation, underlying racial aversion that remains culturally engrained has provided
a predicate for constitutionally resistant forms of modem segregation. Still, upon a
pragmatic reading of recent court decisions, one cannot escape the reality that, for
now, remedial options are limited. Contemporary facilitation of equal protection
interests may require working within the constraints upon the desegregation mandate.
Such a focus need not be inconsonant with seeking a fundamental overhaul of equal
protection thinking. 166 However, major restructuring probably must be consigned to
a longer-term agenda.
Heightened review of post-desegregation policies may be especially necessary in
the short-term to prevent a doctrinal slide past separate but equal to separate period.
The Brown Court, in abandoning the separate but equal doctrine, not only insisted
upon the elimination of dual school systems but upon "the best possible educational
opportunity for all children."' 167 Because the desegregation mandate was embraced
with the expectation that equal protection values could be pursued more effectively,
modem constitutional standards should not countenance any reversion to pre-1954
ways or conditions. Although full equalization prior to Brown was never insisted
164. The utility and sensibility of a cultural meaning test is examined in Lawrence, supra note 55.
165. The significance which a culture attaches to an act or policy, for instance, is central to determining the contours
of liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment, the ambit of constitutionally protected expression, and a reasonable
expectation of privacy and cruel and unusual punishment.
166. The assault upon the separate but equal doctrine attempted both to effectuate immediate equalization and to
educate the Court over an extended period of time regarding its constitutionally fatal flaws. See K. Rwas, supra note 48,
at §§ 4.2-4.3; Marshall, supra note 48, at 318.
167. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205 (1973).
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upon generally, it is difficult to justify any modem standard that would demand less
than what might have been maximally achieved pursuant to the separate but equal
doctrine.
Equalization devices might include magnet schools or other enrichment pro-
grams that may also be helpful in effectuating desegregation or preserving integra-
tion.168 Heavy investment in the magnet school concept, for instance, might afford
incentives that offset or outweigh racial aversion that would otherwise be present.
Consistent with that notion, one court has ordered allocation of $196 million to
transform each of Kansas City's high and middle schools and half of its elementary
schools into magnets-each with a unique curricular theme,169 to encourage shopping
on the basis of interest rather than residence.17 0 Such a program allows parents to
choose where their children will attend school, but does so in terms tailored to
facilitate integration and ensure equalization.
Another option, catering more to majoritarian sentiments, would be for city
students to attend suburban schools at state expense. Such a plan would attempt to
minimize educational limitations imposed by residence, the harsh consequences of
the de facto concept, and the sanctifying of district lines. 1 7 ' Although parents would
have a right to select schools by choosing residence, it would not translate into the
power to exclude those whose educational opportunity was limited by their
location.' 7 2 Such a plan invites attack for siphoning off talented students from poor
districts, transforming urban schools into vocational training centers, and catering to
racist attitudes. 173 It is especially vulnerable to criticism that the policy is built upon
the assumption that most black urban schools are unfit for white students, and thereby
perpetuates racial stereotypes and stigma. Some pragmatists, however, may find such
options useful as a means of accommodating parents' constitutionally protected
interest in how their children will be educated. 174
Neither desegregation nor integration by itself is necessarily an equal protection
elixir.' 75 It would be a mistake to conclude, however, that their respective
168. A high school, for instance, might be the beneficiary of enriched academic and vocational programs despite
abandonment of hope for its integration. See Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 738 F.2d 574,
576 (2d Cir. 1984); Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 712 (2d Cir. 1979).
169. See It's Full Steam Ahead for Magnet Schools, Kansas City Times, Nov. 13, 1986, at A 1, col. I (Metro Ed.).
Individual schools will offer separate curricular themes including computers, communications and writing, environmental
sciences, foreign languages, classical Greek, science and math, visual and performing arts, Montessori, Latin,
engineering and technology, law and public service, ROTC, business technology, agribusiness, international studies, and
health professions. Id. at All.
170. Id.
171. See supra notes 54-83 and accompanying text.
172. Deference to residential housing patterns thus would not necessarily subvert equal protection values in the area
of education.
173. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 480 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Pasadena City Bd. of
Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-36 (1976); A. Bimu, THE SUREM CouRT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 132-33 &
n.47 (1970).
174. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
Modem inclinations to accommodate that parental liberty interest reflect a sense that school enrollment is a joint product
of official and parental judgment. See Coleman, New Incentivesfor Desegregation, 7 Humm Ricins 10, 13 (No. 3, 1978).
175. Negative expectations for minority students in a mixed setting are commonplace. Pursuant to enduring
stereotypes, minority students experience more disciplinary measures. "At the high school level, blacks are suspended
three times as often as whites." Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 20, 1986, at 29-30, col. 1. Critics attritube the disparity
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effectuation and maintenance are no longer relevant to equal protection. Voluntarily
adopted programs intended to promote racial balance, without burdening any racial
group, should also be welcome. For instance, magnet school plans, designed to offset
the significance of residence, may be willingly embraced and not just court-ordered.
Government-supported financial incentives may also be structured to influence
residential patterns directly. Interest rate subsidies, mortgage supplements, or
subsidies and down-payment loans, for instance, might help steer persons into
neighborhoods in a fashion that helped redress past government-influenced steer-
ing. 176 Even if residential patterns cannot be revised radically, the fostering of
racially mixed schools might be augmented by additional incentives such as college
tuition credits for attendance at certain schools. 177 The problem in using incentives is
less the conceiving of ideas than it is a commitment of resources for implementing
them.
The absence of minimal equalization principles or failure to pursue even the
limited options for desegregation or integration could not help but ensure that most
minority and especially "urban ... children [would] be locked in ... schools...
which are as separate and unequal today as they were before 1954." 178 Insofar as
separate schools afford the same unequal education as they did in the past, 179 and do
not even claim to be equal, the prospect exists for reversion to and acceptance of
conditions associated with the earliest years of the separate but equal doctrine's
operation.1 80 The Court invalidated the separate but equal doctrine because it was
clearly erroneous. It would be tragic if equal protection guaranteed less today than it
did prior to 1954.
Whether implementation of magnet school concepts or other remedies presently
available will afford more than a superficial equal protection response in the long run
is dubious. So long as culturally induced racial aversion remains beyond the reach of
equal protection, methodologies for maintaining separation probably will continue to
surface. Modem racial aversion, when placed in a historical context, descends
directly from efforts to maintain white supremacy and separateness, first through
slavery and later through black codes and the separate but equal doctrine.1 81 The
enduring majoritarian inclination toward separation was given impetus by principles
to "a self-fulfilling expectation on the part of many teachers and administrators that black children from ghetto
environments will cause discipline problems." Id. In more blunt terms, it has been blamed on "white institutional
racism." Hawkins v. Coleman, 376 F. Supp. 1330, 1336 (N.D. Tex. 1974). Negative expectations and stereotypes also
help explain why minority students have a higher drop-out rate and may be undereducated or effectively programmed for
failure. See Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 20, 1986, at 29, col. 1.
176. Ohio, for instance, has earmarked part of a mortgage revenue bond issue for first-time black home buyers
moving into predominantly white neighborhoods and their white counterparts moving into areas that are less than 60%
white. See America Moved to the Suburbs, and So Did the Integration Battle, The Washington Post National Weekly
Edit., July 14, 1986, at 34, cols. 1-2.
177. See Coleman, supra note 164, at 49.
178. See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85
YALE L.J. 490, 515-16 (1976).
179. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 782 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
180. The first test of the separate but equal doctrine in the area of education resulted in the affirmation of a school
board's decision to close a black high school and thus deny black students an education, even though white students
continued to attend school. See Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
181. See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Ya.E L.J. 421, 424-25 (1960).
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framed during the 1970s that curtailed the desegregation doctrine. Given that
backdrop, the drift toward majoritarian-sensitive policies in the name of desegrega-
tion effectuation or integration maintenance properly evokes concern that it may lead
toward endorsement of separatist instincts and cause additional stigmatization and
harm. If it does, the only value attributable to such concepts will depend upon
whether they are part of a necessary dialectic preceding an ultimate doctrine capable
of responding to modem racism and segregation.
V. CONCLUSION
For most of its history, equal protection has deferred to majority concerns
regarding matters of race rather than safeguarding minority interests. From 1896 to
1954, majoritarian favoritism was patent. The desegregation interval, at least until the
1970s, represented a discrete phase during which the Court assertively sought to
secure constitutional rights for those traditionally excluded from, underrepresented
in, and oppressed by the political process and stigmatized by virtue of race. Since
then, the grounds for establishing a constitutional violation have narrowed substan-
tially, as have the prospects for meaningful relief even if equal protection has been
denied. Although it may be possible to ameliorate conditions within that framework,
lasting change may be unattainable. Absent an eventual willingness to restructure the
desegregation formula so that it reaches the underlying and enduring causes of racial
aversion, equal protection guarantees will probably remain subordinated to equal
protection legalisms.
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